Codifying \u3ci\u3eCastle Harbour\u3c/i\u3e by Burke, Karen C. & McCouch, Grayson M.P.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository




University of Florida Levin College of Law, burkek@law.ufl.edu
Grayson M.P. McCouch
University of Florida Levin College of Law, gmccouch@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Codifying Castle Harbour, 150 Tax Notes 109 (2016), available at
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/747
Codifying Castle Harbour
By Karen C. Burke and
Grayson M.P. McCouch
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 20151 implements
an eleventh-hour budget deal that staves off the
prospect of a government shutdown by raising the
debt limit and temporarily lifting caps on defense
and discretionary non-defense spending. Driven by
the need to find revenue offsets without increasing
taxes — a limitation imposed by the House majority
— Congress cherry-picked proposals from a com-
prehensive tax reform plan put forward in 2014 by
former House Ways and Means Committee Chair
Dave Camp.2 More than $11 billion in projected
revenue over 10 years comes from provisions for
improved compliance by partnerships, including
$9.3 billion from revised audit procedures.3 Another
$1.9 billion comes from amending the family part-
nership rules of section 704(e).4 These amendments
are aimed not at traditional family partnerships but
at a handful of high-profile tax shelters, involving
billions of dollars in taxes and penalties, that are
working their way through the litigation pipeline.
The 2015 act amends the income tax definition of
partner in section 761(b) by adding a new sentence:
‘‘In the case of a capital interest in a partnership in
which capital is a material income-producing factor,
whether a person is a partner with respect to such
interest shall be determined without regard to
whether such interest was derived by gift from any
other person.’’5 The new sentence is substantially
identical to existing section 704(e)(1),6 which has
been stricken from the family partnership provi-
sions of section 704(e). Aside from renumbering, the
changes appear to be stylistic rather than substan-
tive, substituting a clumsy but gender-neutral ref-
erence to a partner ‘‘with respect to such [capital]
interest’’ for the original phrase ‘‘if he owns a
capital interest.’’7 The end result appears to be a
restoration of the order of the family partnership
1H.R. 1314, Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, P.L. 114-74.
2See H.R. 1, Tax Reform Act of 2014, Discussion Draft, 113th
Cong. section 3618 (2014) (Camp proposals); and Ways and
Means Committee Majority Staff, ‘‘Tax Reform Act of 2014,
Discussion Draft, Section-by-Section Summary,’’ at 119 (2014);
see also Joint Committee on Taxation, ‘‘Technical Explanation of
the Tax Reform Act of 2014, a Discussion Draft of the Chairman
of the House Committee on Ways and Means to Reform the
Internal Revenue Code: Title III — Business Tax Reform,’’
JCX-14-14 (Feb. 16, 2014), at 231-232.
3The audit procedures, which replace the 1982 Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act provisions, are not scheduled to
become fully effective until 2018. See 2015 act, supra note 1, at
section 1101.
4See 2015 act, supra note 1, at section 1102.
5Id. at section 1102(a). The new provision is taken verbatim
from the 2014 Camp proposals. See Camp proposals, supra note
2, at section 3618.
6Section 704(e)(1), as codified in 1954, provided that a
‘‘person shall be recognized as a partner for purposes of this
subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in which
capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not
such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other
person.’’
7Thus, the new provision omits any reference to a person
who ‘‘owns’’ a capital interest or acquires such an interest by
‘‘purchase’’ and no longer declares that such a person ‘‘shall be
recognized as a partner’’ for income tax purposes. The revised
statutory language is probably intended to narrow the scope of
the provision. Unfortunately, however, because the provision
now appears in the general definition of a partner, it might
arguably be viewed as broadening the scope of the safe harbor.
See 2015 act, supra note 1, at section 1102(b)(3) (amending the
caption of section 704(e) to read ‘‘partnership interests created
by gift’’ instead of ‘‘family partnerships’’). The import of the
revised language remains obscure, and there is no authoritative
legislative history to resolve the ambiguity.
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In this article, Burke and McCouch discuss the
2015 statutory amendment, enacted as part of the
last-minute budget deal, that revised and renum-
bered the family partnership provision of section
704(e)(1). They question whether the change will
accomplish its stated purposes of clarifying existing
law and raising $1.9 billion in revenue, and they
conclude that the 2014 proposals by former House
Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp
offer a politically expedient source of selective
pay-fors for future government spending without
actually raising taxes.





TAX NOTES, January 4, 2016 109
(C) Tax Analysts 2015. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
provisions as they were originally enacted in 1951,
when the predecessor of section 704(e)(1) was
added to the definitions of partnership and partner
in the predecessor of section 761.8
It seems implausible that merely restating and
renumbering an existing provision can increase
projected revenue by any amount, let alone $1.9
billion over 10 years. Presumably, the 2015 amend-
ments are intended to close a gap in existing law.
According to the House explanation, the purpose of
the amendments is to ‘‘clarify that Congress did not
intend for the family partnership rules to provide
an alternative test for whether a person is a partner
in a partnership’’ and to ensure that the determina-
tion of whether the owner of a capital interest in a
capital-intensive partnership qualifies as a partner
will be made ‘‘under the generally applicable rules
defining a partnership and a partner.’’9 This implies
that under existing law, section 704(e)(1) might
provide an alternative test for partner status, inde-
pendent of the general definitions of partnership
and partner under section 761.
For many years, courts have consistently fol-
lowed the Supreme Court’s Culbertson decision,
which held that a partnership is recognized for
income tax purposes only if two or more partners
join together with good-faith intent and a business
purpose to conduct an enterprise.10 Moreover, in
recent tax shelter cases, the courts have applied
Culbertson to disregard a putative partner whose
investment was more in the nature of a secured loan
than a participating equity interest.11 Seeking to
circumvent the Culbertson test, corporate taxpayers
such as General Electric Capital Corp. and Dow
Chemical Co. have argued that section 704(e)(1)
provides an alternative test of partner status under
existing law based solely on ownership of a ‘‘capital
interest,’’ without regard to good-faith intent or
business purpose. This argument relies on a hyper-
literal reading of section 704(e)(1) that flies in the
face of the structure, purpose, and legislative his-
tory of the family partnership provisions.12 More
importantly, it lacks support in existing case law.
The Second Circuit emphatically rejected the sec-
tion 704(e)(1) argument in its 2012 Castle Harbour
decision,13 and no other reported case — aside from
the district court decision reversed by the Second
Circuit on appeal — has accepted it. On their face,
the 2015 amendments merely codify the Second
Circuit’s 2012 Castle Harbour decision, but in the
absence of contrary authority, such a clarification
hardly seems necessary.
The projected revenue of $1.9 billion over 10
years from the family partnership amendments
seems to reflect a concern that the taxpayer’s section
704(e)(1) argument might remain viable under ex-
isting law. However plausible that concern might
have appeared while the government’s appeal from
the district court’s 2009 Castle Harbour decision was
pending, the Second Circuit’s 2012 decision should
have put the concern to rest, and by 2015 it should
have been abundantly clear that the section
704(e)(1) argument lacked merit. Although the tech-
nical explanation of the 2014 Camp proposals con-
spicuously omits any reference to the Second
Circuit’s 2012 Castle Harbour decision,14 it is difficult
to believe that the proponents of the 2014 Camp
proposals and the 2015 amendments simply over-
looked that decision. Instead, it seems more likely
that they were not inclined to question whether
8See Revenue Act of 1951, P.L. 82-183, section 340(a) (amend-
ing section 3797(a)(2) of the 1939 code); id. at section 340(b)
(adding section 191, containing the predecessor of section
704(e)(2) and (e)(3), to the 1939 code).
9‘‘Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Section-by-Section Sum-
mary,’’ at 14, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/RU/
RU00/CPRT-114-RU00-D001.pdf. This explanation is posted on
the official House website without any attribution of author-
ship. It is not reprinted in the Congressional Record, nor does it
appear in the legislative history on the Library of Congress
website. See https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/
house-bill/1314 (not including explanation quoted in text).
10See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949).
11See ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d
505 (D.C. Cir. 2000); TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220
(2d Cir. 2006); and Chemtech Royalty Associates LP v. United States,
766 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Southgate Master Fund LLC v.
United States, 659 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2011); and Historic Boardwalk
Hall LLC v. Commissioner, 694 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2012).
12The purpose of section 704(e)(1) was not to provide ‘‘a
statutory shortcut to partner status without regard to the
general definition of a partnership,’’ but instead to ‘‘clarify the
test for determining whether the transferee (rather than the
transferor) of a donated partnership interest should be recog-
nized as the real owner for income tax purposes.’’ Karen C.
Burke and Grayson M.P. McCouch, ‘‘Snookered Again: Castle
Harbour Revisited,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 13, 2010, p. 1143, 1153-1154;
cf. 4 Boris Bittker and Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of
Income, Estates and Gifts, para. 86.3.1, at 86-29 (2003) (‘‘The
reference to ‘ownership’ of a capital interest is odd because it is
a pervasive principle of tax law, seemingly needing no repeti-
tion for a limited class of assets, that income from property
transferred by gift is thereafter taxed to the donee.’’).
13See TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 666 F.3d 836, 844 (2d Cir.
2012), rev’g 660 F. Supp.2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009) (The ‘‘focus [of
section 704(e)(1)] is not on the nature of the investment in a
partnership, but rather on who should be recognized for tax
purposes as the owner of the interest.’’).
14In an earlier Castle Harbour decision, the Second Circuit
explained in a footnote that it had not considered the taxpayer’s
section 704(e)(1) argument and remanded the question ‘‘for
consideration in the first instance by the district court.’’ TIFD
III-E Inc., 459 F.3d, at 241 n.19. Strangely, the technical explana-
tion of the 2014 Camp proposals does not mention the 2012
decision disposing of the taxpayer’s section 704(e)(1) argument
but instead cites the 2006 decision to suggest continuing uncer-
tainty about the merits of the argument. See JCX-14-14, supra
note 2, at 232 n.927.
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existing law was actually unsettled or in need of
clarification, as long as the proposed amendments
provided a sufficiently large increase in projected
revenue without any substantive change in existing
law.15
Even if the 2015 amendments merely ratify the
Second Circuit’s 2012 Castle Harbour decision, the
belated discovery by the drafters of the 2014 Camp
proposals that the scope of section 704(e)(1) was still
‘‘not entirely clear’’ comes at an opportune moment
for taxpayers involved in ongoing tax shelter litiga-
tion.16 Having lost on the merits, General Electric
and Dow now seek to avoid substantial penalties,
and their defense rests in part on the argument that
at least until 2012, it was unclear whether the owner
of a capital interest was automatically recognized as
a partner under section 704(e)(1).17 Instead of clari-
fying existing law, the 2015 amendments may be
used to lend spurious weight to the taxpayers’
discredited section 704(e)(1) argument. In fact, the
section 704(e)(1) argument appears to be part of a
‘‘concerted litigation strategy for rolling back Culb-
ertson and challenging related antiabuse rules.’’18
Perhaps unwittingly, the technical explanation of
the 2014 Camp proposals may lend support to this
litigation strategy. The explanation cites a leading
partnership tax treatise for the proposition that in
enacting section 704(e)(1) ‘‘Congress intended to
override the intent test established by the Supreme
Court’’ in Culbertson.19 This sweeping assertion can-
not be accepted without qualification. Although
section 704(e)(1) modifies Culbertson by allowing
the donee or purchaser of a capital interest in a
capital-intensive partnership to be treated as a
partner regardless of the motive for the transfer, it
does not override Culbertson’s requirement of good-
faith intent and business purpose as part of the
general definition of a partnership; nor does it
create an alternative test of partner status without
regard to the general definition of partnership.20
This is precisely the argument advanced by the
taxpayer and expressly rejected by the Second Cir-
cuit in its 2012 Castle Harbour decision. Ironically,
the cited treatise itself is the main source of the
taxpayers’ section 704(e)(1) argument in ongoing
litigation, and two of the treatise’s principal authors
were actively involved in structuring and defend-
ing the tax shelters used by General Electric and
Dow.21 Although courts have already rejected the
taxpayers’ argument on the merits, the injection of
the discredited section 704(e)(1) argument into the
legislative history of the 2015 amendments is likely
to create new confusion and uncertainty concerning
the Culbertson test.
Given the intense pressure to reach a budget deal
and stave off a year-end government shutdown, it is
not surprising that Congress resorted to ‘‘cherry-
picking tax compliance provisions’’ from the 2014
Camp proposals as a politically expedient tech-
nique for generating the necessary revenue off-
sets.22 In the last-minute bipartisan scramble to find
an additional $1.9 billion of revenue, lawmakers
apparently had no opportunity or inclination to
review the family partnership amendments care-
fully. It is difficult to take the stated purpose of the
amendments at face value, because the Second
15The projected 10-year revenue increase rose from $800
million in 2014 to $1.9 billion in 2015. The difference does not
appear to reflect any substantive difference between the 2014
Camp proposals and the 2015 amendments. Oddly, the increase
in projected revenue occurred after the Second Circuit summar-
ily imposed a negligence penalty in Castle Harbour. See TIFD
III-E Inc. v. United States, 604 F. App’x 69 (2d Cir. 2015).
16JCX-14-14, supra note 2, at 232.
17See TIFD III-E Inc., 604 F. App’x 69, petition for cert. filed,
No. 15-331 (U.S. Sept. 17, 2015) (arguing that a return position
has reasonable basis if the case raises an issue of ‘‘first impres-
sion’’ or the issue is ‘‘unsettled’’ and taxpayer’s position is
‘‘reasonably debatable’’); Chemtech Royalty Associates LP v.
United States, 2015-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,301 (M.D. La. 2015), appeal
docketed, No. 15-30577 (5th Cir. Jul. 6, 2015) (Oct. 8, 2015)
(appealing penalties and arguing that ‘‘at the time Chemtech
filed its applicable tax returns, every court to consider the issue
had held that section 704(e)(1) provided an alternative to the
Culbertson standard for partner status’’). For a more measured
assessment of prior law, see 1 William S. McKee et al., Federal
Taxation of Partnerships and Partners, para. 3.02[5][b], at 3-19
(1990); and Burke and McCouch, ‘‘Illusory Partnership Interests
and the Anti-Antiabuse Rule,’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 22, 2011, p. 813,
816 n.19. The taxpayers have reserved a partner-level penalty
defense of good-faith reasonable reliance, which may raise
issues concerning the tax opinions rendered.
18Burke and McCouch, supra note 17, at 813.
19JCX-14-14, supra note 2, at 232 (citing McKee et al., Federal
Taxation of Partnerships and Partners, para. 3.02[3], at 3-21 to 3-25
(2007)). The explanation also notes that section 704(e) was
enacted ‘‘to prevent the IRS from denying partner status to a
taxpayer who shared actual ownership of the partnership’s
income-producing capital on the basis that the interest was
acquired from a family member.’’ JCX-14-14, supra note 2, at 231.
Cf. 1 Arthur B. Willis and Philip F. Postlewaite, Partnership
Taxation, para. 2.01[1], at 2-6 (2011 and 2015 supp.) (explaining
that the principal purpose of section 704(e)(1) was to clarify that
‘‘a partner in a partnership in which capital is a material
income-producing factor will be recognized as a partner for tax
purposes if the partner owns a capital interest, regardless of
whether that interest was acquired by purchase or by gift’’
without regard to ‘‘the actual motives for the transfer’’).
20See Burke and McCouch, supra note 12, at 1153 (‘‘Section
704(e)(1) is best understood as modifying one particular appli-
cation of the Tower-Culbertson test by carving out a safe harbor
for contributions of donated capital while leaving the test intact
for determining the validity of a partnership under section
761.’’).
21See Jesse Drucker, ‘‘Bermuda Triangle: How Merck Saved
$1.5 Billion Paying Itself for Drug Patents,’’ The Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 28, 2006, at A1.
22Marc Heller, ‘‘Camp Tax Plan Lives On as Farm for Budget
Offsets,’’ DTR G-6 (Nov. 4, 2015).
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Circuit had dispelled any lingering uncertainty
about the scope of section 704(e)(1) three years
earlier in its 2012 Castle Harbour decision. There is
no reason to believe that the amendments will
actually clarify the law or raise revenue; indeed,
they may well have the opposite effect. In the
absence of contrary judicial authority, there is no
need to codify the Castle Harbour holding, and
doing so in such a clumsy fashion may lose more
revenue than leaving section 704(e)(1) unchanged23
or repealing it altogether.24 This is a far cry from the
comprehensive tax reform promised by the 2014
Camp proposals, but it suggests that those propos-
als may be destined to lurch forward, zombie-like,
as a fertile source of dubious revenue offsets.
23The 2015 amendment may lose revenue if a court were to
interpret the revised statutory language as broadening, rather
than narrowing, the scope of the section 704(e)(1) safe harbor.
See supra note 7.
24Although section 704(e)(1) has arguably been essentially
redundant since its original enactment, the provision may have
been retained to preserve a safe harbor for donative transfers of
partnership interests. See supra note 12.
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